The authority of law in Joseph Raz's theory: a critical aspect

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Resumo

The key thesis of Joseph Raz’s philosophical and legal theory on the authority of law and the arguments associated with it are critically examined. The need to consider this topic is due, on the one hand, to high significance of the legal scholar’s conclusions for one of the most relevant areas of legal thought – analytical jurisprudence, and on the other hand, to insufficient representation of works on this issue in domestic theory. The stated goal of forming a critical understanding of the theory of authority of law determines the definition of general context of Raz’s scientific work, the main provisions of his views on law and key problematic theses. As a result, it was established that the legal scholar’s theory contains two contradictory arguments: on the claim of law to authority provided by legitimate power, and the absence of general obligation to obey the law. Raz adheres to a strict attitude towards preserving the positivistic understanding of law and does not sufficiently integrate his own statements of the social determination of law into the concept of formal normativity. The established scientific reflection of the views of the legal scholar shows that the internal contradictions of the theory are due to its conceptual nature and the limited possibility of explaining the practical aspects of law associated with its moral acceptance by individuals within a single theory.

Sobre autores

M. Gorbunov

Lobachevsky State University

Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: maxandgor@gmail.com
Nizhny Novgorod, Russia

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